2026-11-09 - Special Public Safety Committee

1 >> 5 >> Just checking to make sure you can hear me okay. >> Yes, we can hear you. >> Thank you. >> All right, it's 3:30 and our final committee meeting of the day is a special meeting of the Public

Safety Committee. Those committee members are McKittrick, Cramer, Lombardo, Hannah, and Garrett. We have all committee members present except for Councilman Cramer. Whenever you're ready, Mr. Chair.

>> Thank you, Clerk Viviano. I'd like to call the Public Safety special meeting to order. Councilperson Wilson has organized some guests for us to speak on the issue of flock, Uh and I'd like to yield

to council person Wilson to introduce our guests. Thank you. >> Thank you so much. Um this is an open Q&A session for council. Um we have uh two great speakers today which I'll uh introduce in a

second. Um I also wanted to flag I did send an email with an updated memo and a letter for council consideration in your email. So something to flag. Um uh we're joined today by uh two attorneys. Um

one is Professor Michael Gentithes. Um he is an associate dean for academic affairs at the University of Akron Law School. Um uh and his uh teachings and research uh focus around criminal procedure,

constitutional law, uh legal theory, and legal research and writing. I know he's joined in person. Um I'm sorry to be remote, professor, but it's it is nice to see you. [laughter] Um and then we are

also joined online here by attorney Tanisha Fair. Um she has worked as a privacy research assistant with the director of uh cybersecurity and privacy uh protection at CSU Law. And then she's also done

some work um advising the Cleveland Community uh Police Commission Surveillance Technology Working Group um on the development of ALPR or automatic license plate reader uh use policies up in Cleveland

for a CPD. So thank you so much for taking time. Um and I know we have a I think a hard hard stop at 4:30-ish. Um so thank you uh for making time. I'll pass it back off to the chair. >> Thank you,

council person. Um we'll go ahead then uh we'll let the professor start and uh we can proceed from there and we'll have some questions and hopefully uh some engagement. >> Thank you all so much for

having myself and my uh my uh other speaker as well. Uh happy to share my thoughts as much as I can to advise the Council on flock cameras and license plate readers in general as as Fran mentioned, my

specialty, my area of studies in Fourth Amendment constitutional law and theory. So I'll I'll try to give you some insight into constitutionality of these systems, which I think is one of the issues

that I've been told to try to address today. But I'm happy to make this kind of an open discussion, answer questions you might have and offer what expertise I can along the way. You know, I think the

the biggest search from a sorry, the biggest question from a constitutional perspective is whether use of flock cameras amounts to a Fourth Amendment search. And so let me kind of back up and explain

why that matters under Fourth Amendment law. Essentially, if we're determining whether a investigatory activity might violate Fourth Amendment rights, the first question to ask is whether that

activity amounts to a search, which sounds like a pretty simple question, but is actually a kind of technical evaluation. Now, keep in mind, we're going to talk a little bit about what constitutes a

Fourth Amendment search. Just because something is a search does not mean that doing it is unconstitutional. It just means that the Fourth Amendment applies. And so if investigators want to conduct a

search, they either need to get a warrant or they need to fall under a previously recognized category of exceptions to the warrant requirement. But before any of that kicks in, we have to decide

whether that activity is a search. So let's start there and figure out where courts kind of stand right now. And and that's mostly what I'm going to offer is is my understanding of where the courts

are today. I could articulate my own theories of whether I think flock cameras are a search or not if that's useful for you, but that's one professor's opinion amongst many. So I don't know how much

that'll help you. So the way this is analyzed and and I I understand you heard from Chief Morgan maybe a few weeks ago, Um, his memo explains it somewhat well, um, that under Katz, we determine

whether or not a search has occurred based on reasonable expectations of privacy. Um, has the investigatory activity violated reasonable expectations of privacy that we as a society as a whole might

maintain? Um, that is not a personalized uh inquiry. It's it's really about what most of us would expect to remain private. Um, there's lots of categories in litigation that have evolved over time.

Uh, what I'll say to start is there have been a few recent Supreme Court cases that shed some light potentially on this area, but they mostly involve cell phone related surveillance activities. Um,

and what the court has said in those cases, Carpenter and Chatri most recently in June, is essentially that the standard is a little bit higher for location information that's collected by a uh

service provider of cell phone technology, um, because of the capabilities that technology has. It's extremely precise. It's very comprehensive. It essentially allows retrospective time travel by

investigators who want to go into the historical record and determine where someone was at a particular time. And it's a an entirely new activity, a new ability that investigators officers didn't

traditionally have. Um, now some predicted that after those cases maybe automated license plate readers would not be a search because they're different from that cell phone tracking technology, which

essentially places a homing beacon on all of us cuz we all carry cell phones with us most of the time. Um, the argument there again, and I think Chief Morgan summarized some of it pretty well, um, is

that it's not as comprehensive. Uh, license plate readers are can performing individualized captures of one license plate at a time and those license plates are themselves not something we expect

privacy in. We're in fact required to display license plates, and that's kind of the whole point so that people can readily identify an automobile and its owner. Um, another nuance in those cases is

there has long been a theory from ivory tower types like myself that if you amalgamated enough information from various sources, um, maybe the individual pieces of information that an investigator

collects aren't a search, but the mosaic that that creates is itself a search. The Supreme Court in its decision in Chatree just this June seemed to put a little bit of water on that mosaic theory

idea, essentially saying that we aren't going to say the collection of a few data points from a cell phone as far as location is okay, but a lot is too much. We're not going to try to draw some

constitutional line in the sand. All of that collection counts as a search. And so now it becomes a question of which side of the line do license plate readers fall on? Is each individual data point a

search or are they not searches at all and you can collect as many of them as you would want, again, without a warrant or other exception to the warrant requirement fitting? Um, so I'll just say a few

things about where courts are at this point. Um, and it's mixed, but the majority of courts have found that license plate readers are not a search. Um, so an example of that, uh, the Central District

of California in a ruling, um, a few months ago, uh, held that the use of four images from ALPRs in a kidnapping investigation was not a search, and they distinguished those Supreme Court cases about

cell phones, um, the ways I just described. This is not all-encompassing surveillance like those. It's not a detailed log of someone's movements. It's just one specific location point, and it wouldn't

provide sort of a detailed window into someone's associational history. Again, that's a common theme for um companies like Flock themselves and their literature. If you peruse their websites, that's

typically the similar argument that you will hear. Again, the issue though is is how comprehensive that becomes, especially when you consider other surveillance technologies that investigators have at

their fingertips. Um and there is an historical factor too that I mentioned before. This allows surveillance back in time that wouldn't have been possible otherwise with uh traditional surveillance

technologies. So a recent decision, this is just the beginning of October by the Northern District of Oklahoma in a case called United States versus Kyle ruled that it was a search for an officer in

Oklahoma uh to use Flock's national database and the reason he used it was he saw a California license plate essentially driving by. Thought it was a little bit unusual. Uh wanted to research whether

that person was making just a quick day trip to Oklahoma and it turns out they were and it turns out in fact they were doing so to obtain drugs and take them back to California. Um the court

essentially said the opposite of what prior decisions have raised, that license plate readers don't just track one vehicle at a time. They provide access to a continuously updated network of location

history for all vehicles that are caught by those cameras. Um the judge in that case viewed that as a form of indiscriminate mass surveillance, not one that's targeted on a single individual and and

worried that this technology will continue to improve, get more precise and create a larger dragnet over time. Um again, the weight of authority has largely been against finding that these uh amount

to a Fourth Amendment search, but there is some now authority coming the other direction. Those are mostly at the trial court level. The ones I just summarized were both trial court cases. There isn't

a lot of higher level court review of this. Appellate courts haven't gotten to it very much. I'll highlight one. Uh the Fifth Circuit in March of last year found that the use of historical ALPR data

was not a Fourth Amendment search. Um, there's one high state court ruling that's kind of interesting in Massachusetts in 2020. The highest state court essentially said that limited use of license

plate reader technology was not a search, but if this became more refined, if it created too much of that mosaic we talked about, that might amount to a search. Again, that ruling might be undermined

by recent Supreme Court decisions, but you can sort of see the strands that different courts are are ruling again. Um, you know, I I will say once more, that's not the end of the constitutional

analysis. It's really just the first step. From there, you need to determine whether the officers obtained a proper warrant, and if not, whether this fits some other category of exception to the

warrant requirement. And I'll point out that some of those exceptions seem like exactly the kinds of cases that at least Chief Morgan and others in the law enforcement community suggest these are

going to be used for. Ongoing exigent circumstances, a kidnapping, um fleeing felon from a bank robbery, those sorts of things. Um, so I think there's an argument to be made that when it's used in

those circumstances, the warrant requirement may not apply at all anyways. Now, that's not a argument for or against this as policy. Um, you know, I can opine if you'd like on my views about the

policy behind these, um but my expertise again lies in the constitutional analysis, so that's mostly where I'll leave my discussion. Um, you know, I would say if you're thinking about it in terms of

policy, you want to focus on who has access to this information, who's retaining this information, and when and if it's being destroyed. Um, and I'm happy to to dive into those things a little bit

more if if you all have questions. Um, but I'll I'll yield to the other speaker as well and and happy to have an open discussion from there. >> Before we go on to the next speaker. Does anybody have

any questions for the professor at all at this point? I'm not seeing any. Okay. >> Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. >> Thank you. Thank you. Appreciate your comments. You brought up that in courts of law as

far as LPRs, license plate readers, majority of cases have come up with that they're not a search. They've come so they've basically cited, I'm assuming with law enforcement on these. Is is there any

is there any courts that have any of these gone to the Supreme Court? I haven't seen any of them yet. >> No, it's mostly been at the trial court level like a there there's only been one or two even

appellate court decisions before you get all the way up to the Supreme Court. I mentioned the the Massachusetts highest court is one of the few that's ruled on these and that was actually several

years ago before some of the Supreme Court precedent has changed. So I would have said with some confidence probably 6 months ago that I doubt the Supreme Court would find these to be a search.

Supreme Court's decision in June about cell phone location, which involved geofencing, we can talk about that a little bit more, shed some doubt on that. I think the Supreme Court intimated,

especially when we're talking about cell phones that nearly everyone carries in their pocket that are just kind of a part of our anatomy at this point, that that was a little bit too much surveillance

for them to be comfortable with without some Fourth Amendment control. And so they found that to be a search. They actually remanded the case though to determine what kind of warrant is necessary to

access it. So I would say that as far as litigation over LPRs, it's very early days still. So it's it's tough to predict. >> Can could you quantify the majority? Is it a 60/40? Is it a 70/30? Do you

know I mean where are we at? >> I don't have precise numbers. I would I would guess it's about 5 to 1 at this point. >> Okay. Thank you. >> Thanks, councilman. Councilwoman Mobian. >> I guess guess

I'm looking at this as one tool that's being used by our safety force to assist in solving crimes. And I I keep hearing about the different features that people say that they they are afraid that this

is reading, you know, sexual orientation or your identity or whatever, your facial recognition and and what I've read and what I what I talk to people who think that know about this tool, they say

that it is a license plate reader. And and I guess as we go up and down these streets all over the city, um you know, sometimes people see things, they may take somebody's license plate number down,

especially if they suspect that they're doing something. How does that differ? I guess my only concern is I know that Congresswoman Sights has a bill pending, but but her bill strictly talks about the

misuse or abuse of this tool. And if it's done with no guard rails and the state and the local officials are not doing anything to establish policies and all of that, uh she is proposing some

penalties, you know, because we do get financial assistance from the federal government um to assist in our work. But if they're strictly used as a license plate reader, uh help me understand what the

real concern is. Um and it based on everything I've heard and talked to people about, there's no way to identify your nationality, your ethnicity, any of those discriminating factors. And people I

know are concerned about almost everything with ice being out there running around. Um, you know, I would be too if I were in some of these situations. So there are a number of concerns that people

have and I do understand the concerns, but I'm also concerned about the crime rate in our city as as most people are. And any tool we can make available to officers to help them do their work and

solve crimes and you know, that kind of thing. I want to make sure those tools are available. So I don't want to give people the impression that I don't understand, but I I am considering their

feelings, but I just want to know what is this gadget able to do? [snorts] And and and are we expanding what possibilities there are because we feel or we think I just want to know what does it really

do? >> So I'll I'll start with taking the point as I understand it, which is that they are license plate readers. You know, one of the things I was asked to address is whether that I know or have more

information about whether facial recognition or cellular tracking is capable. I don't know of anything like that at this point, although I do think it's unrealistic to assume that things will stay

static, that these technologies won't advance and could involve those technologies and abilities in the future. What I'll say and you've you've essentially elucidated exactly the arguments that are

made on both sides of these. Yes, observing a license plate in public is not a traditional search when one officer sitting on the top of a hill observes you speeding down the highway. The question is

whether that changes in character when you're able to store that information over time, look at it retrospectively and potentially access it about thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions, who

knows, of of incidents. And that's the same distinction that you know, I draw an analogy to the idea traditional surveillance techniques, um that would have focused on one individuals activities out

on public roadways. Um it takes a lot of offer officer energy and resources to do surveillance for say nine months straight of every single movement of an individual over time, which is what that sort

of cell phone tracking allows you to do. I think there is an analogy to be drawn to license plate readers if the network is thick enough, let's say, and it's easy enough to follow an individual uh

over the course of time and see where they have been. Uh one of the concerns raised by Justice Sotomayor about that and you you referenced it a bit is how that affects our associational freedoms, um

how much you'd be able to learn about a person's political preferences, sexual orientation, um activities on a daily basis. Um that's one concern that Justice Sotomayor has raised. I'll say that's not

one that the entire court has endorsed in a majority opinion, but it's one that's been discussed. When you're looking at all of that, again, a lot of um a lot of the academics in my field have tried

to put a word, put a term around what the big concern is and it's that mosaic, that collection of enough data points about someone that you you just start to know a whole lot about who they are. And

I'll note that one of the the concerns that's also raised is that license plate readers aren't the only form of surveillance and and I know that um that Chief Morgan also mentioned that that's

probably a drop in the bucket for the overall surveillance abilities of of investigators. Um but the amalgamation of all of them can be extremely powerful. Um you know, these are um data points that

can be uh combined in a predictive analytic computer program to quickly paint a very clear picture of of who individuals are and I think that's why so many folks are concerned. >> And just the other

point I just wanted to make since brought up a number of things, I can go to the Board of Elections, voter registration information, and get more information about an individual. You know, their

political affiliation, their age, in terms of their the year of birth, their address. I mean, I can get all of that just and that's public information that anyone can can find. And and I don't know.

I'm just thinking that that seems to give me more than what I think this but I don't know that. It just seems to be that on the surface. >> I would say that it's true that that information can be

publicly accessed in other ways. It's about the ease with which it can be accessed and the volume of it which can be aggregated together in ways that modern computer science technology can really use

effectively to understand a lot about a person. You know, it's that's the argument is in part that if you allow the individual data points to be collected without some constitutional protection,

you're starting on a slippery slope because you've got to draw a line somewhere. If you allow one data point and then you allow a hundred and then you allow a thousand, all of a sudden you're you're

feeling like you're underneath the panopticon of some kind. So you also talked a little bit about use and abuse and and concerns about access. I think that's a huge policy concern. If if you were to

implement these programs, if you were to continue to renew contracts with Flock or consider other license plate programs, that's that's definitely a huge issue is not that the majority of those folks

with access or even a tiny minority, it's probably one bad actor, two bad actors here and there, but that's all it takes. It can it can be very powerful. And I think that controlling for that is

really really important when you think about these technologies. >> Thank you, Councilwoman. Those are some great questions that this some enlightenment there. So, Councilman Garrett. >> Uh thank you,

Chair, for the opportunity and thank you to our guests there for the valuable insight. I guess my my question or concern to you would be in terms of you you mentioned Chief Morgan a couple of times

and I want to just highlight a document that he created the Flock camera license plate readers facts and myths. And so when we talk about the Flock cameras there is no oversight of the Flock cameras.

Is is there Well, let me pose it this way. To your understanding, is there oversight over the Flock camera system in regards to who's able to view the information off of the camera that Flock places

in Ward 3? >> I don't have any specific insight into how those processes work. Again, my understanding is that there is a a system by which the reason for accessing that information is logged from a

dropdown menu. I haven't personally observed how those systems work. I don't know the procedures as far as you know, whether a an officer in the field has immediate access to that information or

whether they need to get approval from higher levels of authority before doing so. I know that that would typically be the arrangements you'd try to put in place if you were concerned about those

access and abuse issues, but I'm not as familiar with the specific procedures in Akron. >> So so I guess then the question comes about Flock is not open to FOIA requests. So then Flock has access to

the cameras. And so when you take a look at just one of the questions that Chief Morgan mentioned is one of the facts or myths, it says federal agencies have unfettered access to Flock data. Can you

definitively tell me if that is a true statement based on the fact that we don't know what Flock does with our information once they capture it from a community like Ward 3 and that information now is

no longer in the Akron's control. Can you tell me that no one can get to that information that [snorts] that ICE doesn't have access to that information, that the federal agencies doesn't have access

to that information. Is this an accurate statement? >> What I can say is that that is the information Flock has made public about their systems. I can't verify that Flock is accurately presenting how

information is stored or how long they maintain it. You know, the the publicly available information suggests that Flock maintains those records for 30 days and that this kind of sharing agreement

between agencies has to be bilateral between both sides. But I can't verify that that's being followed through on or that that Flock's data management systems are in fact limited in those ways. You

know, what I can say is there has been research reporting recently about reasons Flock data has been accessed and that has included some reasons related to ICE enforcement or immigration issues. Now,

who is accessing that data and what it means is still a little bit unclear from my understanding. Do you have access, for instance, if information is shared with a particular law enforcement agency in

another location, what does that access include? Is that live access to all cameras immediately? Is that retrospective access within the 30-day window for a specific camera at a specific time and only

on request for that specific information? That I can't say and that's that's really the devil's in the details on a lot of that. >> And and thank you for for for just clarifying that you cannot say.

You're not 100% No one can be 100% accurate. So to create a document that has these facts uh for our 180 residents is sort of troubling. So let's go on to one of the The ICE has access um to Akron

Police Department cameras. Can we definitively say, because this is one of the myths and facts that the chief had mentioned as well, we cannot 100% say that ICE does not have access to Flock data once

that camera captures a community like Ward 3 and take that information although Akron may have it and their police department may have it. But what's stopping Summit County? What's stopping the Ohio

Federal Bureau? What's stopping uh ICE? What's stopping other agencies from accessing Flock's information once they capture that information? >> Right. So I I think, and I take your question to be

about uh how ICE might obtain that information from another agency with which Akron has an agreement to share data. And that's not something that I think Akron itself controls if it makes those

agreements. Um my understanding is that ICE itself doesn't have an agreement with Akron or with the Flock system as a whole that would allow it to access that information. But potentially another law

enforcement agency that's involved in that sharing agreement, once they have that data, I don't I don't think anyone can can reasonably speak to where that data might be stored unless we start

researching each individual jurisdiction's policies, contracts, and and so forth. >> And And thank you for for that information. So this is just a I'm glad we have this opportunity to have this forum

where now when an individual presents something to our residents or folks as facts, um we're realizing that that isn't facts at all and that this information needs to be further federated out and we

need to have a further discussion. Um, I know that this is a fast-paced moving AI, um, in terms of what information they're able to capture, what information is able to be shared. And so this is why

it's so concerning for a lot of us, um, how fast it's moving. Um, so many people, some of our older residents don't really understand. They seem to think this is just, oh, this is helped to catch the

criminals and and look at their license plates, and it's so much bigger than that. I mean, when you look at so many so many identity thefts that are happening to some of our seniors, um, this

information with this AI is moving at such a pace that it would make sense since we don't have all the answers, like we mentioned a lot of the facts and myths, that we would just only reasonably take

time to better understand it so that we can better educate our residents. But thank you. I won't take up too much of your time. Thank you, professor, for your information. Thank you, chair. >> Thank

you, councilman. Uh, I'd like to go to council person Wilson, and then I would like to, uh, let our other guests have some time to present as well. Go ahead, sir. >> Absolutely. Thank you, chair.

Yeah, I just I wanted to pivot over as well. Um, thank you, professor, for answering some of those questions. Before I pivot over um, to attorney Farah, I also want to, you know, we our contract with

Flock, um, you know, it's publicly accessible. Our our data sharing clauses are in section 4.2 and 4.4, and we give certain licenses for sharing, um, including, you know, irrevocable perpetual license

for aggregate data. We also give access for they Flock to share our data with any law enforcement agency. We give pre-consent for that, um, in our contract, right? So just something for consideration.

And and the 30-day deletion to my understanding is just around footage, not on data specifically. Um, I don't think that says anywhere in the contract about that. Um, I did I was curious from attorney

Fair who's worked around the Cleveland area around this what like what's happening in Cleveland and what are lessons that we can learn from what's going on up there. >> Thank you Councilman Frank. Can

you hear me okay? Thank you. My internet is acting a a bit strange so I apologize if there are any lags but so bringing up what you just said part of the issue that I've been seeing is we drafted

those general police orders about two years ago and they went into effect in 2025. In just that short time it has become very clear that the protections and guard rails that we placed are not enough

to protect against some of these issues. And if I may I >> We can't hear you anymore and you were frozen for a minute there. >> There we go. I thought so. >> Thank you. >> [clears throat] >> What what

is the last thing you heard? Let me ask you that. >> Just take it from the beginning so Steph you don't mind. >> Okay. I'm also going to turn off my video to see if that helps. I apologize. I am in

the local library. Okay. Can you guys still hear me? >> Yes. >> Awesome. Okay. So basically the point that I was making is that working on this with Cleveland from the time that we drafted this about

two years ago until now, it has become very clear that protections and guard rails are often not enough to protect against the issues that come up um when it comes to privacy with ALPRs. I want to

make it very clear that that is not just a Flock problem. That's a problem with any vendor that you use, Motorola, Axon, whoever it is. Um going back to what you all were asking about data sharing,

I'll start there. Councilman Friend was talking about uh council person Friend was talking about um what those contracts with Flock say. One thing I want to bring up is that Flock itself just changed

its terms and conditions with a lot of its customers. Um so now they've actually expanded their ability to collect and keep your data. And so I think that that to me it is a very big issue because you

know their their contracts usually say that the customer controls the data, but then it has all these other caveats. So for instance, one of the major things that it's changed which council person

Friend already mentioned is that they have a perpetual license that cannot be revoked where they can use the data that it collects to improve their services after your contract ends or it's

terminated. So you have no idea how long that data will continue to be kept. Um in addition, just this year they removed a specific sentence in their conditions and terms stating that the company

would not sell customer data. So that means that now if they wanted to, they can actually sell customer data whenever they would like to. Um which I think is a very a very concerning thing and going

back to council woman's concerns of trying to figure out why this is such a problem when it's only reading license plate readers, one of the reasons is that a lot of the folks whose license plate data

is being collected are innocent folks. They're not criminals. So now this company, this private company has all this data for folks who have not been convicted or accused of any crimes and now they're

able to sell that data or they're able to keep it for however long. Um, the other thing that you all may or may not have noticed in their contracts is that they mention that they have exclusive right

to determine and control the method, timing, format, and medium of access to the data. So personally, I would say that them claiming that you own your own data is really only a name. Um, some other

notes of things that I've come across in just kind of researching this in other jurisdictions is that it has been very difficult for folks to be able to terminate their contracts once they're in them.

Um, so for instance, a few jurisdictions have told Flock they don't want to keep their uh cameras. Can you come and pick them up? And it takes Flock weeks to come and get them. And then all of a

sudden, after they've been deactivated, they are reinstalled without the city's permission. They're still running, and they're still logging plate data. This is after these um customers have already

told them that they want to terminate these contracts. Um, the other thing that that has been really strange is I know that you may have seen that some other jurisdictions, particularly also in Ohio,

have been covering their cameras with bags once they've deactivated, waiting for them to be taken down. Um, and now some of these agreements are saying that that is considered a breach of contract,

which I find very strange um to say that they're not able to cover them all of a sudden when the contract is no longer in place. And so that tells me that there may be some funny business happening

with Flock, personally. Um, they've also expanded their own protections against liability if there is a data breach. So now that is left that cost is now shifted to taxpayers. And again, a lot of

these taxpayers are folks whose data is being collected without their consent, without them being able to opt out. Um, so those are some of the big things around data sharing that I think are worth

noting. I do want to add that Flock did change their um their normal time frame now is 7 days instead of 30 days. However, that has to be opted into by the customer. And if you already had an existing

contract before they made that change, you get to keep whatever the previous period you chose was. So, say for instance, you all were just about to go into a contract with Flock. And their normal

default is we'll delete your data after seven days. You have to opt into that. If you as the city say, well, we don't want it to be deleted for a year or for six months, then that that will be the

actual term. Um so that really is very dependent upon different factors. Um they also have an evidence mode where they can keep data longer for investigations. So that is a time where that seven day

period no longer applies. There's also language that when your contract ends, there will be um confidential information including the customer's data will be deleted within 90 days, but you have to

request that. And Flock won't delete that data if it has to keep it for what it considers to be an applicable legal obligation or policy. Um so that basically means that they might share this data as

as someone else already mentioned with ICE, with DHS. Um my research has shown that they're claiming that these federal agencies do not have direct access, but obviously police officers are able to

help circumvent that by looking things up for DHS or ICE. Um additionally, Flock has not been transparent about the fact that they did have contracts with DHS and Border Control in the past. They

claim that those have ended, but there was a time where they had a pilot program with both of those agencies and were telling the public that they did not. Um so I do think that the lack of

transparency that Flock has had quite a bit in the past would would give me pause um when thinking about trying to start anything up with them. Um one example that I really wanted to bring up just to

give you some more examples to look at, Austin, Texas is a city that has had the strictest program when it comes to AOPR use with Flock. They've since gone back and forth um trying to figure out if

they'll use Axon or not, but even with having the very strictest language in their program of any jurisdiction or state, they were still finding that those guard rails were not keeping police officers

from circumventing things in the system. that's mostly to do with how Flock has built it. So you may have heard that Flock has created um a few different changes to its system claiming that it helps

to, you know, protect and and ensure that people are not able to misuse the data. But what has been found in a lot of jurisdictions is that police officers are able to get around this by simply using

vague language. Um there has also been unfortunately police officers who have used language quite literally he he he and la la la in Oregon and in Norfolk. And that was enough for them to get past

that system. So that tells you that whatever guard rails have been put in place either by Flock or by yourselves still may not be enough to protect um the public from what from any bad actors and you

don't we don't get to, you know, we don't get to control who who chooses to be a bad actor. It also doesn't take very many folks um to take this data and for it to become public on the internet. That

has happened at least twice already. Once in Boston um and then there were over it was around 50,000 um license plate numbers were available on the dark web and also some photos of persons after a

company hired by the Customs and Border Protection was involved and there was a breach and this company, this private company much like Flock kept that data without being authorized to keep it and it

was on the dark web. So I know that that may not seem like much but the Boston ALPR database that was downloaded and made publicly available had a million or so records with people's home addresses um

for anyone that had a parking permit and it also had data of 2,500 people who are suspected of being in a gang or a terror who are terrorists. So I think it's safe to say that one of the major

concerns around this data is that it can easily be it can it sometimes be breached and there are not any real um guard rails outside of what a city chooses to put in place to ensure that it's safe.

Now, thankfully from what I hear it sounds like Akron has made it to where other communities or agencies cannot access their data if I'm correct. Um however, that that doesn't stop any officers in the

department from being able to take that data and misuse it. Um and so you you may have heard and I know council woman you mentioned some of this. A few of the different misuses have been around people

um tracking protesters, people uh searching for abortion related searches, immigration related searches. And I think that that's really important. I know that it seems like only having the data on the

back of a license plate doesn't give you much, but as uh Dean Michael has already mentioned that data can be patched together for you to be able to find the movements of a person. That can tell you

where they worship, that can tell you what they're politically associated with. It can tell you a lot of things about them, what clinics they go to. That's all very personal information. And as we can

see it's been used to unfortunately track folks who have been seeking abortion care, who are immigrants. These cameras are often historically also disproportionately placed in black and brown

communities. So, I think that that is also something important to note is that it has a disproportionate effect on specific communities and also in lower community lower income communities. So, I

think that that's something important to to notice. Um I also want to make sure that I address some of question earlier uh about keeping communities safer. There has been no peer reviewed data or

study showing that the use of ALPR systems actually reduces crime. There have certainly been um some connections made, some one-off connections made in terms of certain police departments, but there's

no peer-reviewed data that that says that, that shows solid proof that there's causation between using mass surveillance and reducing crime. Um and so I think that that's important to note because

Flock often makes mention of a study that was done in the University of South Carolina saying that it reduced car thefts by 11 %. But then another organization, the Institute of Justice, went in and

looked over their methodology, looked over their study, and they found that they actually heavily weighed the data um in favor of agencies that had higher pre-existing vehicle thefts. So what that

means is that once they changed those weights and they weighed every police department equally, every agency equally, there was no significant change when weighing the data when it came to crime

reduction. So I think that that's important as well. That is not to say that ALPRs have never helped in any way, shape, or form, but it is to say that it's important to consider whether mass

surveilling everyone is enough of a weight in terms of how much crime reduction there is. And I also want to make it clear that a lot of the time there might be other factors contributing to that. So

for instance, around the time of this study, there previously had been a lot of thefts with Hyundais and Kias. Before they got these ALPRs, crime was already being reduced and arrests were already

increasing. So that tells you that there are other factors going on in the environment that can make it seem as though the ALPRs themselves are the reason when they may only be a very small part of

the picture. So I do think that that's very important. And the other thing is that um ALPRs can have very high inaccuracies, false positives. And I don't know if you all have heard about the case in

Toledo where Flock misread a number and a man was wrongfully stopped at gunpoint. He had dogs sicked on him and he was held in jail for several hours. This man who was innocent. So, I just want to

make it clear that this is about more than I think Flock certainly and other ALPR vendors want to make it seem. But when you really dig into this and see what is going on in other jurisdictions you're

able to find that there are false positive rates, folks are being stopped and held at gunpoint, which is very could be a very dangerous situation. And there are a lot of privacy concerns when when

there's no there's like minimal oversight, not many restrictions on this. Folks can use this and do thousands of queries of cameras across the country. And even if Akron yourselves if you are not

doing that, that is part of the concern for a lot of folks. And again, as I've mentioned, even with the guard rails that you have in place, there are still unfortunately opportunities for misuse and

abuse as we've already seen in Akron and in other places. To answer your question, council person Fran, right now what Cleveland is doing is the Cleveland Police Commission has actually paused our use

of these cameras until January 1st. They're wanting to get more community input on these cameras because unfortunately in Cleveland they were put in place without fully talking to us in the community.

Which I think is another thing to consider if you all have not done a lot of taken a lot of time to speak to your community to figure out how they feel, but also what does research say? Because I

think sometimes folks hear that it's a camera, it can stop crime and that's enough for them. But unfortunately the average citizen doesn't know half of the things that I or Dean Associate have been

sorry, Dean Michael have been telling you about these cameras. So, I think that that is also something to consider. And so that's paused for right now. There's talk of the police department possibly

trying to move to Axon, which a lot of us are fighting against because they do have ties to DHS as well. And they other types of technology that can be um connected to these cameras that make it even

bigger, dragnet surveillance. Um and that's also a very big concern. So I think the issue here is not specifically with Flock but with automated license plate readers in general. So I do want to leave

some time for questions if anyone has any. >> Thank you, Attorney Fair. Um are there any questions? Uh Councilman Greer. >> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Um I want to first thank um all of our speakers and

all of my colleagues for the questions that have gone forth thus far. Um this question could be for either of you. Uh but could you speak some to the legality of even from an equal protection

standpoint where you have a disproportionate uh number of cameras in communities of color and or in uh lower income communities. Have there or could there be legal challenges uh to the

disproportionate implementation of the Flock cameras? >> Demichael, please. Go ahead. >> Yeah. Uh to my knowledge, I haven't seen those kinds of challenges yet. I know those concerns have been raised

about how Flock cameras have been implemented and whether that um distribution has been equal or unequal or or focused on particular neighborhoods or communities. Um whether that's a viable claim um

you know it it it doesn't cross over with the Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis. It would be more of an individual rights claim under equal protection as you suggested or maybe a due

process claim. Um my very inexpert opinion is that that's that's unlikely to succeed. But again, I haven't seen it even attempted. So, I couldn't tell you what the what the current landscape is like.

>> Thank you, Councilman. Councilman Lombardo. >> Thank you. Um [clears throat] I know if we asked our chief safety director, Craig Morgan, to cite several examples on on how flock cameras have helped

the community, he could go on till supper. And we don't have that kind of time, but I just want to highlight instead of talking about the data and and everything like that, what it does or doesn't do

and who's all violated. You know, both attorneys and colleagues here gave great um you know, facts and figures. I mean, basically though the we're talking about everybody's carrying these, right?

These cell phones, and I think that automatically gives up your right to certain privacy. So, um you know, you could you could go on with that. But I just want to give a couple examples about how

flock cameras have helped the community. Namely, there was one homicide in Cleveland that within 6 hours the APD located the suspect and and the vehicle in Akron and and he was arrested. Just took 6

hours because of the flock camera. There was a fatal hit and skip on South Main Street a few months ago, September 26th, and the flock assisted in locating that vehicle and charged the driver in the

death of Jesse McCool. Another guy was hit while walking his dog off Merriman. The dog did not survive, but the flock helped locate that vehicle. And these are just some some of the examples just to

name a few. I know this, the National Federal Fraternal Order of Police strongly supports the use of flock, the automated license plate readers, as an essential tool of modern law enforcement. These

types of technology enhance public safety, strengthen investigative capabilities, and protect the officers that serve our community. At a time when law enforcement agencies nationwide face serious

recruitment and retention challenges, this technology is an essential force multiplier. Our APD is short staffed as it is. This makes no sense to suspend the flock camera use, which I know that's

where we're head heading. And we want to attract quality officers without, you know, giving them any tools. It just makes no sense to me. The list goes on and on with the location of stolen vehicles,

missing persons that have been found. Individual misconduct does not justify eliminating a valuable law enforcement tool. We cannot suspend the use of flock cameras just because of one bad actor or

two. Misconduct should be addressed through effective policies and individual accountability, not by denying officers access to these tools that protect the communities and save lives. Thank you. >>

If I may, councilmember, I I do just want to address your comment about phones. I think the difference between this and phones is that a phone allows you to turn it off. You can leave it home. You can

remove permissions from apps. With ALPRs, we're not able to opt out of these systems. And I think that's the major difference here is that folks' privacy permissions are being violated without without

their consent. Um there is an option to possibly try to find a way to allow folks to opt out. There has only been one case that I've found of in California where they had an opt out program for

residents, but I think that that's something that we should heavenly consider. I think it's also important to consider that there haven't been only one or two bad actors in the midst of this. And

also, even if there is only one bad actor, that can result in very heavy issues for thousands of people for for more than just one person when someone is searching for this data. So I think that that

is something to consider. Um that is not to say that you can't consider ALPRs regardless of how I or anyone else feels, but I think that there should be more examination done before putting it into

place because of how dangerous it can be. >> Sure. I mean you could put you could do all the examination uh you want and continue with guard rails. I I don't disagree with that, but uh also you know

with these cell phones I mean who who turns their phone off? I mean I don't I hardly turn mine off, but anyhow the thing is is just you could continue with your um you know audits and things like

that, but I would not suspend the use of flock cameras. >> What I would say briefly just about the phones um is that the Supreme Court's been very clear that the use of a phone is not in any way a

waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, right? That using that phone doesn't mean that you consent in some way um that you're voluntarily giving up your information, your location data. Um ultimately the

court has rejected the position that because you carry a phone which almost all of us do, you've allowed that kind of tracking or that you've given up your rights. Now that doesn't mean that um the

the the policy decision you all have to make swings one way or the other. I mean this this is a balance you have to strike. I don't doubt at all the chief's uh recitation of cases where this has been

extremely helpful. The question is whether that's worth the sacrifices that you're making in terms of of how much information is amalgamated in hands where it could be abused, where it might be shared

with agencies we don't want it to. Um you know I think it it certainly has utility in those ongoing emergency kind of situations and if I as a citizen had my druthers, I'd think I'd want to restrict

very very carefully the situations in which it could be used in which this technology could be um accessed and what kinds of crimes it could be used to investigate, because that makes a tremendous

amount of difference in in the privacy concerns that are raised. But again, um y'all are the policy makers, not me, so. >> Councilwoman Davis. >> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Given the concerns about the

research on crime reduction, what specific quantitative and qualitative measures would you recommend municipalities use to determine whether automated license plates readers are actually improving

public safety? >> Thank you, Councilwoman. Oh, go ahead. Go ahead. I'm sorry. >> I think you you start. >> Well, to be fair, I am not a researcher, so I want to make that very clear. I have worked in

research. Um but I think one of the major things that you could try is first establishing what is a baseline metric before the use of ALPRs. Now, you folks have already started using them, but I think

that that has been one of the issues that has come up regarding this this portion of or area is that there were no baseline metrics um established by these police departments before starting the use

of ALPR. And then we go and say that they're reducing crime, but we don't actually know that if we don't have a baseline metric. So I think that looking more into what that could look like for your

police department, how were things before using ALPRs, which means that you may have to suspend them for a time in order to figure that out, and then be able to see if it actually does anything. Some

of the um one of the studies that was done or some information, I would say, that was pulled by um journalists in Atlanta when they pulled FBI data was finding that there was no significant change in

Atlanta. And that place is the most surveilled place when it comes to these cameras in the whole country. So if you're telling me that that's not making any changes in Atlanta when they have thousands

of cameras and municipalities like mine have maybe a hundred something, that concerns me. Um and so I'll be honest with you, I I don't know if there's an easy way to do this um especially because

there are so many changes being made with AI um and so many developments in AI without any real regulation. I think that that's slightly part of the issue and problem that you'll keep running into. >>

I would also suggest that you be really granular in your data collection so that you're looking at specific types of crimes that may have been affected by this. Um if there are specific areas those

sorts of uh you know the the carjacking, the hit and run, the kidnapping where we think this is going to be most effective, I'd really want to see good data on those areas. Now that that would be

challenging to do in smaller municipalities. You know the dream from a researcher perspective would be to amalgamate a lot of data from a lot of places that have used this program in a very similar

way so your variables are more controlled. That may not be possible um but that that would be the ideal is to get really granular and expand your data set as much as you can. >> Okay, we have a just a

couple minutes left. Um Mr. Hanna. >> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh I'd like to know has anyone or any group ever tried to sue the manufacturers of the flight cameras? And also I I travel from Ohio to

Chicago and I've got a EZ Pass. Would that EZ Pass that uh I carry in my car, would that be considered a flight camera because I never stopped but that reader took all the information off of my car?

Because if I go through the uh uh uh if I go through without that EZ Pass, they know exactly where I was and they'll send me a bill. >> Uh >> I am not an authority on whether any suits have been filed

against Flock or other ALPR companies. To my knowledge, there has not been that effort, but that I I haven't researched that question. I'd have to do a little bit more. You're asking about the

technology behind a license plate reader for tolls on the highway and E-ZPass. It's the same technological approach. Now, where that data is housed and how is it shared, I'm not as familiar with. You

know, there is an aspect of Fourth Amendment doctrine called the third party doctrine that information collected by a non-governmental agency, a third party, might later be shared with government

investigators without raising Fourth Amendment concerns because it wasn't collected initially as part of an investigatory process. So I think that is possible. I haven't really seen that used in a

criminal case, but it certainly is possible that it could be in a in a similar way. >> Has anybody else >> add to that Oh, I'm sorry. >> Has any group or individual tried to sue the manufacturer of

the Flock Flock cameras? >> Not to my knowledge, but again, I haven't researched that question specifically. >> Thank you, Councilman. >> I have also not come across any cases where they sued the

manufacturer of Flock specifically. It was more so against officers. And also to your question about tolls and and passes, there are some communities that have put license plate readers on their

highways as a way to be able to look at the cars. That is not the same in every community, but I do just want to put that out there that there are some some highways, some overpasses that do have this

technology, not specifically your E-ZPass, but actual license plate readers are posted in some communities or used by some Departments of Transportation. >> Thank you. Are there Councilwoman Boyce and

um then we're going to conclude. >> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Um thank you for the presentations. You've given us a lot of information to research. I appreciate that. Um just, you know, wanted to just put

this out there. This is technology. It's neither good nor bad, right? I think we've heard like it's all in how we use it and the conditions under which we're using it. Um we talk a lot about

protecting the rights of the one, um which is important. A lot of this data does concern me and I want to learn more about it. Um I just want to remind us that, you know, when we're talking about the

one whose rights could be, you know, maybe encroached upon, I'd like to remember Deonte Richardson's family whose murder would not have been solved if not for the flock camera on Kenmore Boulevard.

Now that may not that data point may not communicate that we've reduced crime, but we've also helped a family and I think that's important and a critical part of our law enforcement that we need to

remember while we're considering this. But that's all I wanted to say. Thanks. >> Thank you, Councilwoman. Um as Councilperson Wilson said, um we were looking to conclude at uh at 4:30 or 4:33. Um I'd

like to thank our guests that came and shared with us today, uh taking time out of your busy days to do this. And I'm sure if anybody had other questions, we'd be able to ask them um >> Yes. >>

through by email and so on. >> Absolutely, and thank you for having me. >> Thank you. Did you have something, Councilwoman Woman Amobi? >> I just want to make sure that I was clear. I I never meant to

say or I don't think I said it that these things reduce crime. I've always said, I think, is that they assist in solving crimes. And that is what I have read and seen and heard when I've talked to

individuals. So it I just want to make sure that that is clear. And the point that councilwoman Boys made is another point that I had down is that to the victims and the families that are assisted

with this tool in solving a crime, I think that's important for us to consider as well. Thank you. >> Thank you, councilwoman. At this point we will conclude our meeting and public safety will be

adjourned and thanks everyone for their time this afternoon. >> Thank you all. >> Okay, that is our final committee meeting of the day. Council will meet in special session at 5:00. Thank you.